Mauricio Macri, the current mayor of Buenos Aires, wants to be president. But he has some obstacles to overcome: He’s been prosecuted in an illegal wiretapping case, and blamed by a wide sector of society for mismanaging the city government.
It’s a critical moment for his political career. One that could be decisive, even, for the history of Argentina. It’s not, however, the first time he’s been prosecuted. According to Gabriela Cerruti, the author of a biography on Mauricio Macri called ‘El Pibe’, throughout his business career he’s been accused of improprieties, but always let off the hook through appeals to favourable judges.
And the rocky situation he’s in now is not a reflection of his snug background: His father, Franco, emigrated from Italy, and built one of the most powerful family businesses in Argentina. Mauricio, the first born, was the heir to the reins of power.
But father and son didn’t always see eye to eye. Whenever Mauricio tried to advance a business deal, Franco would intervene, reverse his son’s decision, and call him a pelotudo, usually resulting in public humiliation for Mauricio.
According to Cerruti, this is why Mauricio decided to go into politics: to escape the long shadow of his father. “Franco was Il Capo and Mauricio was El Pibe,” she writes.
Franco Macri’s political philosophy was simple, Cerruti writes: always be pro-government. In the early 1970s, Franco advanced in his business career by associating himself with the construction arm of FIAT, the Italian automaker. The joint venture became one of the largest contractors of government projects in Argentina: ports, roads, housing, industrial sites, and thermoelectric plants.
Franco signed an ambitious public housing contract with José López Rega, the eccentric public works minister under Isabel Perón and founder of the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (Triple A). The coup d’etat on 24 March 1976 sent López Rega into exile, but through him the Macris had cultivated relationships with Emilio Massera, the chief of the navy and one of the de facto leaders of the new military government. As the junta set out to crush worker movements and various social and political organizations, they also began contracting massive public works projects, and business was booming for the Macris.
“With the arrival of the Peronist government in 1973, the family had seven businesses. At the end of the dictatorship [in 1983], the holding group was composed of 47 business,” writes Cerruti.
Young Mauricio was there all the while, watching and learning, preparing to one day take over the family businesses. He studied engineering at the Catholic University of Argentina (UCA), and received private instruction on politics and economics, particularly liberal economic theory.
The return to democracy in 1983 turned the Macris into fervent supporters of the Unión Cívica Radical, the political party of Raul Alfonsín. State contracts kept pouring in. Around this time, Mauricio began occupying managerial roles in the family’s businesses, and was a principal shareholder.
But Franco and Mauricio had different ideas about the future of the businesses: Franco wanted to continue with an import substitution model and public works contracts from the state. Mauricio, as an adherent to the neo-liberal economic model, wanted to be in charge of state enterprises through privatisations. The presidency of Carlos Menem favoured the latter.
Menem represented a new era of fluidity and impunity for the state and Argentina’s business community, and the Macris were able to stack the national and city government with their own business managers. Cerruti cites many cases in which state licenses were granted through direct deals instead of through public auctions. And contracts were often minted with lush profit guarantees, whether or not services were rendered by the business.
In 1993, Mauricio became president of SEVEL, the family’s auto-making joint venture with FIAT. But Franco hovered around business meetings, interrupted Mauricio in the middle of negotiations, and often reversed his son’s decisions.
Cerruti writes: “In barely two years, after two scandalous court cases, a drastic decrease in production and sales, and failed negotiations with FIAT not only ended the license for building cars in Argentina but also ruptured relations, after 20 years, between the Italian and Argentine ‘capos’, Franco had to convene a renowned family business psychologist to try to organize the mess. But it didn’t work.”
Shortly after, in an effort to separate from his father and forge his own path, Mauricio decided to go into politics. In 1995, he was elected president of Boca Juniors Athletic Club. In two years, he turned the organization from a non-profit into a private corporation, and created a player ‘stock exchange’, leaving the club’s finances in ruins. He submitted a letter of resignation, but after Franco made calls to members of the board of directors, Mauricio was allowed to return. The hiring of coach Carlos Bianchi in 1999 led to unprecedented international success for the club, and Mauricio was elected to two more terms in 1999 and 2003.
In 2003, newly elected and popular president Néstor Kirchner publicly excoriated the Macris for their role in Menemism. Soon after, Franco, back in charge of the family businesses, was again negotiating contracts directly with the Kirchner government. Franco also began business dealings with China.
As Mauricio became a figure in opposition to the Kirchners, the managers of his political team were the same managers of the family businesses. Mauricio would celebrate privately the contracts won from the state while criticizing publicly the same national government. Franco worried Mauricio’s involvement in politics would jeopardize his business interests, furthering the split between the two.
In 2007, after two rounds of voting, Mauricio was elected mayor of Buenos Aires. Positions in the city government were quickly filled by current or former managers of the family businesses, especially in areas most involved with public works and infrastructure licensing: treasury, urban development, economic development, and education. His first foreign trip as mayor was, inexplicably, to China, where he met his father’s business associates, according to Cerruti.
In the end, the picture of Mauricio Macri that emerges from Cerruti’s book is one of an unscrupulous, far-right leaning, inept businessman who played an active role in a family dedicated to growing its interests in spite of the costs to Argentine society. It might be hard to separate this picture from the person currently governing the city of Buenos Aires, but what of his mayoral policies?
Macri assumed office facing many of the same problems as his predecessors, and it’s likely that four years in office isn’t enough to fix the city’s massive infrastructure problems in education, health, and housing that have been worsening for decades. In his inaugural speech as mayor, he spoke of “efficiency”, “respect”, and “better investment” in infrastructure, and his policies can be hard to define. Interview requests for this article were not returned.
“From what I see, there’s no definite ideology. At the city level, it’s more about the management of the budget, which depends on economic cycles,” said Leandro Haberfeld, a professor of economics at the University of Buenos Aires.
Macri’s first education minister, Mariano Narodowski, recognizing the abandonment of public schools, tripled the budget for public school infrastructure – up to almost 10% of the education budget – for 2008. But despite the increase, 40% of the budget was never paid out, the reasons for which are unclear.
A report by the Civic Association for Equality and Justice (ACIJ) warns of a projection of just 3% of the education budget for public school infrastructure in 2010, the lowest in years and a 59% reduction compared to 2009. Meanwhile, funds directed to private education have increased 88% since 2007.
“The city already suffers from extreme inequalities in education, and there’s no remedy in place now. In fact, it’s being exacerbated by budget management and the prioritization of private education,” said Dalile Antunez, coordinator for equality in education at ACIJ.
Narodowski resigned as education minister when Ciro James, an ex-federal agent hired by Narodowski, was accused of spying. Macri then appointed Abel Posse, a writer and diplomat who had served as counsel and ambassador during the dictatorship. Posse resigned 12 days later after an outcry from diverse sectors of society drew attention to his ties to the junta and controversial views.
On housing, the mayor issued decree 960/09, which modified the city government’s plan of finding a definite solution to the housing emergency to one of “mitigation”. The decree also made it more difficult for people living in precarious situations to access government programs. In 2010, the Superior Justice Tribunal (TSJ) of Buenos Aires ruled the decree was unconstitutional because it “deliberately reversed the obligation of the city government to protect and guarantee the right to housing and assistance”.
On health, evidence of the system’s continued inability to meet demand can be found in the recent increase in the infant mortality rate. After a five year decrease, the General Statistics and Census Office reported a one point increase for 2009 – from 7.3 to 8.3 per thousand – mostly driven by large increases in historically impoverished southern Buenos Aires.
Gabriela Alegre, a city legislator, called it “a grave figure” especially “in the context of economic growth. This fact is telling of the crisis in the city’s health system, and has to do with the abandonment of the most vulnerable sectors and the constant dismantling of public hospitals,” she said.
Macri’s most controversial policies have perhaps been in public safety. Human rights groups have denounced the actions of the Public Space Control Unit (UCEP), Macri’s parapolice ‘task force’, which operated extra-legally enforcing brutal evictions. Macri’s choice to head the Metropolitan Police, Jorge ‘Fino’ Palacios has been indicted for espionage and illicit association for his role in the aforementioned illegal wiretapping case, which could end Macri’s political career. And Macri’s decision to outfit the Metropolitan Police with electric taser guns has been met with widespread public concern.
On almost all counts, Macri’s administration represents a weakening of the role of the state as protector of social and economic rights. If he’s been unsuccessful in further reducing the state and pushing the public agenda to the right, it’s because the current Argentine context doesn’t allow for it: a 2009 article in La Nación outlined more than 20 initiatives started by Macri that were rescinded or never completed because of public or legislative opposition.
In a speech inaugurating this year’s city legislative session in March, Macri highlighted his accomplishments: the refurbishing of the Teatro Colón and the creation of the Metropolitan Police. Meanwhile, the city’s grave problems continue to worsen – not exactly a record on which to fasten a run for the presidency.
But Mauricio Macri, prosecuted for his role in an espionage case, continues as mayor and wants to be president. Over the decades, the politicians have come and gone for the Macris, but the family has always been there, on the margin between the state and private enterprise: “The state behind the state,” Cerruti writes. The difference, now, according to Cerruti, is that Mauricio isn’t content with having that power. He wants to be the power. Of course, running a presidential campaign from a jail cell, if it comes to that, will be challenging.






